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Abstract
Salant et al. (1983) showed in a Cournot setting that horizontal mergers are unprofitable
because outsiders react by increasing their output. We show that this negative effect may be
compensated by the positive effect that horizontal mergers have on the buyer power of
merging firms in input markets.
Bru acknowledges partial financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education project PB98-1402 and Faulí-Oller from
project SEJ2004-02172/ECON and from the IVIE.
Citation: Fauli-Oller, Ramon and Lluis Bru, (2008) "Horizontal mergers for buyer power." Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 3
pp. 1-7




There has been a long debate on merger profitability in Cournot settings since the 
seminal paper by Salant et al. (1983). They show in a symmetric linear Cournot model 
that mergers that do not include 80% of the active firms are unprofitable. They explain 
their result by pointing out that mergers have the negative strategic effect of increasing 
production of non-participating firms. 
Several extensions have tried to increase merger profitability by reducing the extent 
of the reaction of outsiders to a merger. This can be obtained by allowing either more 
convex demands (Faulí-Oller (1997)) or more convex costs (Perry and Porter (1985)).  
Here we take another approach. We consider that firms not only sell the final good, 
but must also buy an input in an imperfectly competitive market. Therefore firms not 
only care about market profits, but also about how these rents are shared with input 
suppliers. We show that mergers increase the share of profits that downstream firms can 
appropriate. This positive effect on firms’ profits of mergers must be evaluated against 
the negative strategic effect of increasing production of non-participating firms. 
We obtain that mergers are profitable when the positive effect is important enough. 
This is the case when the monopolistic power of upstream firms is so high that they are 
able to extract most of the rents of the vertical relationship. In this case, downstream 
firms strongly need to create buyer power from mergers.  
The closest paper to ours is Lommerud et. al. (2005).  They study downstream 
mergers in the case where each producer has an exclusive input supplier and supply 
contracts consist of a linear price. They obtain that downstream mergers are more 
profitable than with fixed input prices, because they reduce input prices. Our model 
instead considers no exclusivity in the supply of inputs and two-part tariff supply 
contracts. Caprice (2005) uses a model similar to ours but he studies the incentive to 






 The model 
 
There is an upstream firm U that produces an intermediate input at marginal cost  0 ≥ c . 
There exists also a competitive supply of the input at marginal cost  c c > . In the 
downstream sector there are n firms that transform one unit of input into one unit of 
final product without additional costs of production. The final product is homogeneous 
and its demand is given by  Q Q P − =α ) ( . 
Upstream and downstream firms set vertical contracts that establish the terms under 
which inputs are transferred. We model this vertical relationship following the 
framework in Rey and Tirole (forthcoming), where contracts are secret (or 
unobservable) and firms have passive conjectures. After contracts are set, competition 
downstream is à la Cournot. 
We want to address how mergers of downstream firms affect the process discussed 
above. Mergers change both the buyer power of downstream firms in the intermediate 
market and their market power in the final market. Salant et al (1983) showed that 
mergers solely to increase market power are seldom profitable. We will see that, when 
achieving buyer power is very important to increase profits, because competition 
upstream is very low (high c), the results on merger profitability are reversed. 
More specifically the situation is modelled according to the following timing: 
 
Stage 1: The efficient upstream firm secretly offers each downstream firm i a two-part 
supply contract  ; each downstream accepts or refuses the deal. If he 
refuses, he may use the alternative supply. If he accepts, he orders a quantity of input 
and pays accordingly. 
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Stage 2: Downstream firms transform input into final product and compete in the final 
market à la Cournot. 
 
We solve the model for the case where downstream firms have passive conjectures (Rey 
and Tirole (forthcoming)). The upstream firm offers to each downstream firm i the 
supply contract he would offer to a monopolist downstream facing (residual) demand 
, where   is the output sold by competitors in equilibrium. Then the 
variable part of the supply tariff is set equal to marginal cost, 
i
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* , whereas the fixed 
  2fee will be set to extract all the rents from firm i, except the amount he can obtain using 
the competitive supply of the input.   
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c α . Then 
the net profits of a downstream firm will amount to  ( ) { } i i
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θ π  
 
θ parametrizes the monopolistic power of the upstream firm and will play an important 
role in our analysis. Observe that θ is increasing in c  and decreasing in c . The smaller 
the cost gap, the higher the competition faced by the upstream firm and lower the value 
of θ. Correspondingly, profits of downstream firms are decreasing in θ. We then have 
that, at one extreme, when θ = 0 there is perfect competition upstream, and we are back 






θ , the upstream 
supplier is de facto a monopolist because the competitive supply is so inefficient that 
does not constitute a valid alternative; as a consequence downstream firms obtain zero 
profits and all the rents are appropriated by the upstream firm. The “monopolistic” 
nature of the input supply, however, depends not only on the level of production costs 
but also on the number of firms n that compete downstream. We will concentrate below 











θ , and the results we obtain will allow us to 







  3Profits from a horizontal merger of k+1 downstream firms is defined
1 as the 
difference between post-merger and pre-merger profits of participating firms: 
 
) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( θ π θ π n k k n + − −    (1) 
 
A merger is said to be profitable if (1) is non-negative. It is useful to rewrite the 
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We can identify the effect of θ on profitability through the effect of changes of θ on 
the left hand side of (2), which is strictly increasing in θ. This analysis yields to the 
following result: 
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Salant et al. (1983) obtained in a Cournot setting that mergers are profitable only if the 
number of participating firms is high enough.
2 In proposition 1, we show that mergers 
of any size are profitable, provided that θ is high enough.
3
The intuition of the result is interesting but not straightforward. A graphical 
illustration is useful to explain it. Figure 1 illustrates the situation in the standard 
Cournot setting ( 0 = θ ). Figure 1.a plots the pre-merger residual demand of a firm, and 
figure 1.b the post-merger residual demand. The reduction in rivalry moves the residual 
demand to the right, even though in equilibrium non-participating firms expand their 
production. Salant et al. (1983) show that, unless k is high enough, the profits obtained 
                                                      
1 Vertical mergers are addressed in the original paper of Rey and Tirole (forthcoming).  
2 They consider  0 = θ . Then, a merger is profitable only if  ( ) n k, θ  is negative. This amounts to 
n k k > + + 1 , which only holds if k is high enough. 







n k θ , and therefore the interval in proposition 1 is non-empty. For θ in the 
interior of this interval, the merger is strictly profitable. 
  4after the merger (area B) are lower than k+1 times the profits obtained before the 
merger (area A). 
Figure 2 considers what happens when c  increases while c  stays constant
4. In 
equilibrium, downstream firms will still be supplied by the efficient upstream firm at 
marginal cost. Therefore the sales of firms do not change. This implies that the pre-
merger (post-merger) residual demand in Figure 2a (2b) is like the one in Figure 1a 
(1b). However, the profits downstream firms obtain change because they depend on the 
possibility to use the competitive supply: as it has become less efficient they will 
obviously obtain less profits (A>A' and B>B'). But the main point is that a firm is more 
affected in its profits by an (absolute) increase in costs, the lower its (residual) demand. 









). Therefore it is more likely that a merger is profitable, the higher 
the value of c (and hence ofθ ). 
Salant et al. (1983) showed that (given n) mergers larger that a certain minimal size 
were profitable. In our model, the same result is obtained for any θ . The existence of 
the minimal size comes from the fact that the left hand side of (2) is increasing and 
convex in k. Furthermore, the minimal size is decreasing in θ . It comes from the fact 
that the left hand side of (2) is increasing in θ . This highlights the positive effect θ  has 
on merger profitability.  
Combining the existence of a minimal profitable merger size and Proposition 1, we 
can obtain the values of θ for which mergers of any size are profitable. Consider a 
merger of two firms (i.e. a merger for which k = 1); Proposition 1 tells us that it is 











n θ θ . If a two-firm merger is profitable then mergers of 
larger size are also profitable, because a minimal profitable merger size exists. Hence, 
all mergers are profitable in this interval. When θ is high enough, the increase in the 
residual demand (through a merger) is the only way to obtain significant profits. 
Imagine that in figure 2.a we had set c slightly below the intercept of demand. Then 
pre-merger profits would be so close to zero that mergers would be profitable. If any 
merger is profitable although firms are obtaining positive (even if small) profits before 
                                                       
4 It is the change that increases θ that can be represented more easily.  
  5the merger, it is obvious that mergers will also be profitable when firms do not obtain 








Concluding Remarks.  
 
Rey and Tirole (forthcoming) showed that vertical mergers are profitable when 
supply contracts are secret. In the same setting, we have shown that horizontal mergers 
are also profitable. Therefore, in future work, it would be interesting to study the 
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